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French imperialism and to recognize
the “sacrifices” made by France’s armed
forces in the Algerian War.
Sartre is biting in his psychological dissection of both torturer and victim. He
maintains that torture stems from racial
hatred and that only by believing an individual to be less than human can one
justify torture.
We should be grateful for this timely
republication of The Question, as it reminds France of a chapter in its history
it has tried hard to forget. It is also evidence that fighting terrorists by sacrificing one’s humanity ensures not just a
long war but an endless one.
MICHAEL H. CRESWELL

Florida State University
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In this excellent monograph, Michael
Evans argues that Australia has a distinctive way of war that focuses on continental defensive strategies. These
strategies, for most of its history, have
been abandoned by statesmen upholding Australia’s extended vital interests
in a favorable regional and world order.
In other words, Australian military
strategists instinctively think about
homeland defense, especially of the air
and sea-lanes connecting Australia to
the world, but their political leaders inevitably require them to adapt their
strategies to intervening around the
world as a member of coalitions of
like-minded liberal democracies. In the
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United States, we call this a “policystrategy mismatch,” but Evans calls it
the “tyranny of dissonance,” with the
interventionist tradition of Australian
foreign policy pulling one way and the
more isolationist official Australian
military strategy pulling another. In
that respect, Australia resembles Britain
and the United States, which have also
been torn between “splendid isolation”
and foreign intervention in different
periods of their histories.
Evans is as relentless as a fly at a picnic
in the Australian outback in demonstrating his thesis, which makes his style
sometimes just as annoying. He might
have limited his analysis to a few archetypal case studies and so made his point
with greater power in fewer words. He
does prove, however, that both the geographical position and unique political
culture of Australia have inclined its
military leaders to treat their continent
as an Anglo-Saxon island in the middle
of Asia, one that needed to be isolated
from the rough-and-tumble of regional
and global conflicts. Time and again,
however, Australia’s dependence on
great powers (first Britain, then the
United States), as well as the broader vision of Australian political leaders,
compelled it to adopt a coalition strategy of “limited liability.” Both to avoid
overextension and to demonstrate their
bona fides to Australia’s allies, statesmen “down under” have consistently
made limited commitments to imperial,
later international, security in World
War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam,
the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Like more unilateral interventions in
East Timor and the Solomon Islands,
these expeditions demonstrate that official Australian defense strategy is often
out of sync with Australian foreign
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policy. More precisely, these trends
show that official strategy will probably
have to be abandoned again, so Australians will have to develop the expeditionary means to back up their
interventionist interests.
So, what are the Australians to do about
this tension between their cultural instincts and their strategic necessities?
Evans, who served as a major in the
Zimbabwean army before emigrating to
Australia, is hopeful that Australia’s
gradual shift from its “white only” culture of the early twentieth century to a
more pluralistic society in the
twenty-first century will increase the
growing tendency of Australians to see
themselves as stakeholders in both the
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international system and the regional
balance of power in the Pacific and
Asia. Echoing contemporary American
misgivings about poor interagency cooperation in the United States, Evans
also calls for what he refers to as the
“whole government approach” that
matches Australian foreign policy and
defense strategy, so neither is formed in
a vacuum. Australians would still make
limited-liability investments in foreign
interventions but would have a better
chance to develop strategies and force
structures suited to their extended interests in a liberal world order.
KARL WALLING

Naval War College
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